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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the role played by social norms which legitimize parental control over choice of brides for sons, in determining parental incentives to educate daughters, in a transitional economy, where preferences conflict across generations, the labour market is dualistic, and the marriage market exhibits competitive dowry payments.
Parental control leads to persistence of low levels of female literacy, despite economic growth and large returns from female literacy. In steady state equilibrium, the proportion of educated women is uniquely determined by the magnitude of male employment in the high wage sector. Income gains for men or women, larger returns to female literacy, lower returns from child labour and tax-subsidy interventions all turn out to be ineffective in raising female literacy levels. If, however, grooms themselves determined their wives, then universal female literacy would be the only possible steady state outcome, despite dowry payments.
Evidence from school attendance and literacy figures indicates that, in south Asia, girls are much more likely to be put to work (typically inside the household or in the informal sector), rather than sent to school, than boys. In light of the widespread presence of the institution of dowry, i.e., payments from the bride's family to that of the groom, this reluctance appears puzzling. 1 Patrilocal marriage practices and cultural norms prevalent in most parts of south Asia would seem to imply that it is her husband's family which stands to retain the major part of any additional income an educated woman would generate. Thus parents themselves may have little direct incentive to invest in daughters. However, for precisely the same reason, parents would seem to have a strong incentive to prefer educated women as brides for their sons. This seems particularly likely if returns to women's schooling are significant, whether directly, from the labour market, or indirectly, within the household sector, where the schooling of women may 2 have important positive effects on the human capital of future generations. 2 Then, intuition suggests that, ceteris paribus, parents of educated women should face lower dowry demands. Thus, adjustments in dowry rates should provide an indirect incentive to parents to educate their daughters. Yet, in light of the persistence of a large gender gap in literacy and education levels in south Asia, this indirect incentive appears to be neither generalized, nor very strong in the aggregate. 3 Analyzing data from six villages in south-central India, covering 1923 -1978 , neither Rao (1993a , 1993b , nor Deolalikar and Rao (1998), nor, indeed, Edlund (2001) could find any evidence that greater schooling of brides is associated with a significant reduction in dowry. What explains this phenomenon?
A large literature exists on the institution of dowry. Yet, a formal investigation of the implications of this institution for parental incentives to invest in the education of daughters does not appear to be available. 4 Given the pervasive conjunction of dowry in south Asia with low levels of female literacy, and a large and persistent gender gap in literacy and schooling levels, such an exercise is of considerable importance, from both theoretical and policy perspectives.
One of the central features of a marriage contract in south Asia, especially in the rural areas, is that it is typically 'arranged', i.e., a contract negotiated between parents of the individuals who actually marry. Social norms make it accepted cultural practice for parents to have a major, effective say in the choice of marital partners for their offspring.
New couples are generally expected to live with the groom's parents. This suggests that parental objectives in choosing wives for sons may conflict with the interests of their sons. This possibility seems particularly likely in a transitional society, i.e. a society 3 undergoing rapid changes in its social framework, such as south Asia, where the values, objectives and lifestyles of the younger generation are often at sharp odds with those of their parents, and which is exhibiting a movement away from the traditional 'joint family' system, towards the nuclear family. 5 Yet, the ramifications of this system of arranged marriage with dowry payments, within a context of 'generational conflict', have not received attention in the economics literature. Our specific contribution lies in tracing its implications for parental incentives to educate daughters. Caldwell et al. (1983, p.359) , discussing the popular justification for a large age difference between husbands and wives in south India, put the perception thus. "Where brides are older and closer to the bridegrooms in age, they will probably fit less readily into the extended family, and their emotional bonds with their husbands will probably compete more with the bonds between husbands and their mothers." A similar apprehension would lead parents to prefer a large education gap between their sons and their daughters in law, as a method of reducing the possibility of domestic discord and household partition. 6 On the other hand, respondents in village surveys in south India almost universally affirmed: "(P)arents desire their daughters to marry educated men with urban jobs, … because the wives of such men … will usually live apart from their parents-in-law" (Caldwell et al. (1983 p.347) , italics ours). Rural parents are "…giving their daughters more schooling, … even though such investments cannot be offset against the amount of dowry. Rather the schooling is explained as the minimum qualification for securing an educated husband…" (Caldwell et al. (1983, p.357) ). This suggests rural parents value education in brides if they happen to have educated sons in the urban sector (or, more generally, in high wage occupations), but not otherwise. represents the positive rent that accrues to an individual merely by virtue of his being able to acquire a place in the H sector; for convenience, this rent, like the return to education, is assumed to be received entirely early on. All female and child workers are employed in the L sector. The proportion of male workers in each generation who are initially absorbed in the L sector is thus at least ) ( h 1 − . Once adult workers enter a 6 particular sector, they stay on in that sector till the end of the period. Each child can earn w c . All earnings, adult as well as juvenile, are received at the end of the period. 8
During childhood, each individual may either be sent to school or sent to work by parents. Any child, if sent to work, adds w c to household income. However, when child workers reach adulthood, they can only find unskilled L jobs. Skills that children acquire through schooling improve their future (adult) earnings by more than the foregone income: s > w c . Schools are free. 9
The set of all couples belonging to generation
, respectively, we denote the proportion of girls in generation t who are sent to school, or put to work. Thus, t E p also denotes the proportion of educated brides in generation t, and t N p , that of brides who are not. The corresponding values for boys will be denoted, respectively, by
Agents are married off, to individuals chosen by parents, once they enter the labour market. Employment and educational status are common knowledge at the time of marriage. At that time, parents of sons receive the promise of some amount of money, d, as dowry from parents of daughters, to be paid at the end of the period. The dowry contract is costlessly enforceable. All consumption in each period takes place at the end of the period, immediately after all incomes, including dowry incomes, are received.
Agents cannot borrow across periods. 10 Parents pay, and retain, all dowry. 8 One can interpret labour market dualism in terms of 'formal' and 'informal' sectors of the economy, whereby the formal sector is characterized, because of institutional, transactions cost and efficiency wage considerations, by high and relatively rigid wage levels with employment rationing, whereas the informal sector is the residual sector marked by market clearing wage levels. Formal sector jobs are likely to be largely urban, but employment in government and quasi-government institutions constitute an important source of such jobs in rural areas. Informal sector jobs are found largely in agriculture, petty trade, services and small-scale manufacturing. Alternatively, we can assume that h proportion of male workers are innately more productive than others, and that it is this inherent ability which is reflected in their higher earnings. Yet a third interpretation is that h proportion of households are endowed with incomeaugmenting assets, in particular, land, which adult sons inherit from their parents. Allowing some, or even all women, to have H jobs will not alter our conclusions. (See Remark 3.8 below.) We include selfemployment as a possibility in either sector. 
faces a triple of dowry rates
, so that he has to pay parents of a, say, type H groom an amount Hk d if he wishes to marry his daughter to that groom. Thus, there's a sextuple of dowry rates
which parents take as given. The parent of a daughter of type k decides whether to make a marriage offer to the parent of a groom.
The offer includes the promise to pay the groom's parent jk d , where
denotes the groom's type. The groom's parents can either accept the offer, or reject it and (costlessly) wait for another offer.
Given a vector of dowry rates, we say that parents of i weakly prefer a match with parents of j if the utility that parents of i get from marrying i off to j is at least as high as the utility they would get from marrying i off to somebody other than j. Strong preference is defined analogously. A feasible groom profile for generation t is defined as:
, where L(.) denotes the Lebesgue measure. Thus, an individual groom in generation t is characterized by: (a) the couple in the earlier generation he is born to, and (b) his own type. A groom profile is just one possible way in which the grooms could be assigned to different types. A groom profile is feasible if (a) the size of the type H groom population is not larger than the employment capacity of the H sector and (b) H jobs remain unfulfilled only when there is a lack of educated male applicants. The set of all feasible groom profiles in generation t is t g A . Analogously, a feasible bride profile for generation t is defined as:
. A marriage allocation for a feasible profile
in generation t is a one-to-one and onto mapping from t g a to t b a . Thus, given a specific feasible collection of grooms and brides, a marriage allocation is some way of matching every groom with a bride in that collection, and vice versa.
Preferences and Inter-generational conflict
Each adult couple is characterized by a single set of preferences. Given a family, we shall identify the constituent couples in the older and younger generations by P and S, respectively. Each couple consumes two goods, X and Y. Let P P y x , denote the amounts of the two commodities consumed by P, while S S y x , will denote the amounts of the two commodities consumed by S. The P couple's preferences over their own, and their son's, consumption bundles are given by:
while the S couple's preferences are given by:
Note first that there exists a 'generation gap': preferences vary across generations.
Second, parental preferences are 'paternalistic': they are better off if adult sons follow their lifestyle, i.e., consume according to the parents' preferences. 11 G is increasing, with G(0) = 0, while n measures the type of husband that P's daughter acquires. Ceteris paribus, parents consider men who earn more better matches. Formally:
The assumption that sons are better off if parents consume according to the sons' preferences is for simplicity.
We can also generalize the utility functions, at the cost of algebraic detail. 
At the beginning of the period, parents purchase the domestic capital asset of typeα .
Once their son gets married, the S couple has to decide whether to spend their earnings to produce within the available domestic technology set, or to form a separate household by paying the fixed price a. Evidently, should they form a separate household, S would acquire domestic technology of type β .
One can think of this formalization thus. Early on, the P couple set up a household, i.e., acquire a house to live in and organize their activities according to a particular set of rules. The parental household is thus organized according to the values and preferences of parents. For example, P may set apart space for religious activities, but not for entertaining guests or watching television. Or they may object to consumption of alcohol. S have different preferences. However, S find themselves constrained in consuming according to their own preferences if they live with parents. They cannot entertain friends, watch television, or drink alcoholic beverages, because of lack of 10 space, or because of the psychic cost from parental objections and consequent domestic friction. Social norms may also require that they turn over the major part of their own earnings to parents, who then decide how that money is going to be spent on the S couple's consumption goods. S can free themselves from 'parental interference', formalized as consumption restrictions, and spend their earnings in a way that best satisfies their own preferences, if they form a separate household organized according to their own goals. But, to do so, they must spend the amount a to purchase capital assets, such as a house and some consumer durables, necessary for setting up a household. . Let P's own income in the period be I P . We We first embed the idea that wealthier S couples are more likely to separate.
By A1, if both members of the S-couple are in the L sector, and at most one is literate, then they will not separate. However, if both are educated, then they will do so, even if both are in the L sector. By A2, if one member of the S-couple is in the H sector, then the couple will separate. By A1 and A2, if parents have a type H son, then that son will separate, subsequent to marriage, regardless of the type of bride they choose. However, if he is of type E L , the son will find it rational to separate only if parents choose a type E bride. An uneducated L son will never separate.
The net gain to parents with H sons, from choosing a type E (rather than N) bride, is:
The net gain to parents with E L sons, from choosing an E bride, is:
We assume the following.
A3. s < a.
12
A3 builds in the idea that returns to female education in a transitional economy are significant, but not extremely so, due to lack of complementary inputs such as capital, technology and infrastructure.
Given A1 and A3, we must have, for any arbitrary k P ∈(0,1),
Summarizing our discussion, then, we have the following result. 
Thus, due to parental altruism, H parents can strongly prefer E brides even when such brides bring in lower dowry. Parental self-interest dictates that L E parents strongly prefer E brides only if they bring in higher dowry, and possibly prefer N brides even if E brides yield higher dowry.
Remark 2.2. Evidently, if sons were choosing brides themselves, then they would always be willing to accept lower dowry for an educated bride, regardless of their own type.
STEADY STATE EQUILIBRIUM
Given dowry rates and a feasible profile, a marriage allocation is stable if no parent strictly prefers a match different from that specified by the allocation. This implies no parent should strictly prefer marrying his son/daughter to a different person, regardless of that person's type. Neither should a parent strictly prefer the person his progeny is actually marrying to be of a different type. 
Equilibrium dowry rates must be such that brides and grooms can be matched in some way that leaves all parents satisfied, at the price vector for alternative types that they are facing. Thus, a vector of dowry rates will constitute an equilibrium if, given those dowry rates, we can find at least one feasible profile of grooms and brides which has a stable marriage allocation corresponding to it. Lastly, we need to identify equilibrium properties of the marriage market that are steady state, i.e., inter-temporally stable. This is ensured only if no parent has reason to regret educating, or not educating, his son/daughter. One way of thinking about this restriction is in terms of perfect foresight on part of parents. Alternatively, if we assume that parents expect current dowry rates to persist, then, if the feasible profile today is such that parents regret their past choices, then parents in the next generation, observing current dowry rates, would make different decisions. This will lead to a different feasible profile and, thereby, a different vector of equilibrium dowry rates. Thus, neither the initial feasible profile nor the initial vector of dowry rates would be inter-temporally consistent.
A steady state equilibrium vector of dowry rates therefore implies the existence of a marriage allocation whereby no parent could have done better by having a different type of daughter, whether with the same groom or a different groom. The analogous requirement must hold for parents vis-à-vis sons as well, with the additional consideration that parents can only choose the educational status of their sons, but not T constitutes a steady state equilibrium in the marriage market if it satisfies conditions (i), , (ii(a)), (ii(b)) and the following:
and α was married to β ].
Definition 3.4. (i) A feasible profile that corresponds to a steady state equilibrium vector of dowry rates will be called an equilibrium feasible profile.
(ii) A marriage allocation that is stable with respect to a steady state equilibrium vector of dowry rates and an equilibrium feasible profile corresponding to that vector of dowry rates will be called a steady state equilibrium marriage allocation.
If a steady state equilibrium vector of dowry rates exists, then we can find a pattern of educational choices and stable marriage allocation in every generation which will (a) allow these dowry rates to persist indefinitely as the equilibrium outcome in every generation, and (b) allow that pattern of educational choices to be reproduced indefinitely as the aggregate consequence of rational responses by individual parents to that equilibrium vector of dowry rates. Lastly, we wish to abstract from male illiteracy in order to focus on female illiteracy.
So, we ensure that the dowry premium that educated grooms would command in a steady state equilibrium is a sufficiently strong incentive for parents to educate sons.
We also ensure that, for identical reasons, parents would prefer a literate son to have an H, rather than an E L , job in a steady state equilibrium. Implications:
Proposition 3.5 implies that an expansion in the size of male employment in the H sector will increase the female literacy rate. Thus, the transitional process, i.e., a process of technological innovation, capital formation and secular growth, if it progressively draws a larger proportion of the male workforce into the high wage economy over time (as in the classical two-sector model of Lewis (1954) ), will also generate progressively higher levels of female literacy. A reduction in the size of the male workforce in the high wage sector will however reduce education levels among women. 18
Remark 3.7. If 'jobless growth' in the H sector increases incomes in that sector without increasing its size, then the female literacy rate will not improve. Similarly, so long as A1-A5 continue to be met, increases in the informal sector wage rate, reductions in 17 One often observes sharp differences in dowry rates across economically similar, but traditionally exogamous, communities. Our model, with its multiple equilibria, is compatible with these observations. Cultural and historical factors may determine exactly which of the alternative equilibrium dowry vectors hold in practice. Furthermore, if different exogamous communities have different proportions of men in high wage occupations, then our model will predict corresponding differences in female literacy rates across these communities.
returns to child labour, increases in returns to education in the L sector, will all turn out to have no effect whatsoever on the steady state literacy rates. 
. Then, given A1-A5, 1 q E = * , and:
Proof: See the Appendix.
Recall that, from (2.3), 0 > Φ . First suppose the state cannot (for political or administrative reasons) tax parents for not sending daughters to school, i.e., 0 = τ . Then Proposition 4.1(i) implies that, to raise the female literacy rate above h , parents have to be given a subsidy larger than their earnings from work performed by daughters. Thus, simply compensating parents for foregone earnings from female child labour does not make it worth their while to send daughters to school. If the state cannot provide a subsidy, i.e., 0 = b
(say, because of budgetary constraints), then it must tax parents who do not send their daughters to school by an amount higher than c w . Thus, completely mopping up parents' earnings from the labour of their daughters, by an equivalent tax (or, alternatively, somehow suppressing child labour), does not suffice to improve the level of female education either. More generally, Proposition 4.1(parts ii and iii) implies that relatively small tax/subsidy intervention will be completely ineffective, leaving the degree of female education in the economy unchanged. This happens because, for 20 parents to have an incentive to educate daughters, it is not enough to compensate/eliminate their direct monetary gains from child labour. The state must compensate parents for the higher dowry they'll have to pay for L grooms as well. 20
Thus, parental authority in marriage decisions once again serves to make the level of female illiteracy sticky.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have explored the interconnection between employment opportunities for men and parental incentives for educating daughters in a transitional economy, where preferences vary across generations and dowry rates are flexible. We have shown that 
APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 3.5:
Step 1. We shall first show that, given A5, . However, in that case the N parent would be better off with an educated son, regardless of whether that son is E L or H, a violation of Characterization 3.3. An exactly analogous reasoning rules out the other possibility that the N groom is matched with an E bride. Hence, there cannot be any N grooms in a steady state equilibrium feasible profile.
Step 2. We now establish that, given A1-A5, For this to be sustained as an equilibrium outcome, dowry rates must be such that (i) E parents weakly prefer E L grooms, and (ii) E L parents weakly prefer E brides (both by Definition 3.1). These conditions imply, respectively, that: 
Combining (N3) and (N4), we get:
Now, if E L parents weakly prefer E brides, then, by Lemma 2.1(ii),
which, by (N5), implies that E parents strongly prefer H grooms. But, in that case, by 
The E L E match implies, by Lemma 2.1(ii),
, which, in light of (N8), yields: 
then E L parents strongly prefer N brides (Lemma 2.1(ii)). Hence, for the dowry rates to constitute a steady state equilibrium which generates universal education of daughters, it must be that
(by Definition 3.1). We must therefore have:
.
If the higher payoff is with an H groom, then we
, which implies (since, from requirement (i),
. We thus have:
As before, in light of Lemma 2.1(ii) and Definition 3.1, for E L parents not to have any incentive to strongly prefer N brides, we need:
Combining the two conditions, we get: ) is a steady state equilibrium outcome, we must have:
Step 2:Now suppose ( ) . This completes the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 4.1.
(iii)Part (iii) of Proposition 4.1 follows immediately from Lemma N1 and Lemma N2.
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